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Abstract
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and CH2M HILL, Hanford Group, Inc. (CH2M HILL)
[also referred to as the Tank Farm Contractor (TFC)] are evaluating the Demonstration Bulk
Vitrification System (DBVS) as a supplemental treatment technology for low-activity waste
(LAW) at the Hanford Site. As a new facility at Hanford, the safety analysis for the DBVS is
being subjected to new and evolving DOE requirements.
Hazard categorization for the facility is being closely examined since this determines whether
performance category (PC)-2 or PC-3 requirements are to be applied for natural phenomena
hazards, as well as differing requirements under Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(DNFSB) Recommendation 2004-2, Active Confinement Systems1• Questions have also arisen
regarding application of DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for u.s. Department ofEnergy
Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses 2, or DOE-STD-1189-2008,
Integration ofSafety into the Design Proces;, format and content, as well as full implementation
ofDOE-STD-1186-2004, Specific Administrative Controli and naming conventions and content
requirements for the interim safety analysis documents under DOE 0 413.3A, Program and
Project Management for the Acquisition ofCapital Assets5 (e.g., Preliminary Documented Safety
Analysis or Preliminary Safety Design Report). Another challenge is the integration of the
programmatic chapters of the safety document with those of the Hanford tank farms, since the
tank farms Safety Management Programs (SMP) are relied upon for the DBVS facility.
All of these issues and their resolutions, as well as the level of scrutiny to which internal and
external regulators have held this project's safety analysis, will be discussed in this paper.
Introduction
The DBVS will receive waste from the single-shell tank (SST) 241-S-109 Partial Waste
Retrieval System (PWRS) and treat the waste by converting it into containers of immobilized
glass that meet the waste acceptance criteria for disposal at the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF)
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on the Hanford Site. The DBYS is a full-scale research and development facility intended to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the bulk vitrification process as a method for treatment and
immobilizing LAW fractions from tank waste for onsite disposal. The purpose of the DBYS is to
provide:
• Demonstration of the technology that can produce an acceptable immobilized waste
product to support a decision to supplement current and planned tank waste
immobilization technologies.
• An enhanced bulk vitrification testing program with the capability to test waste
processing under full-scale radioactive conditions to provide design, construction,
operating lessons leamed, and operation training that could minimize technical and
schedule risks for a full-scale bulk vitrification system.
• Demonstration of the safety and effectiveness ofjoule-heated melting for radioactive tank
waste.
• Demonstration of meIter throughput, availability, and reliability while processing an
active waste stream.
• Demonstration that the waste form can meet the waste acceptance criteria for the Hanford
IDF.
• Provide critical permitting data for the full-scale project.
• A forum to optimize technology, startup, and operation for a production facility.
• A forum for facility startup, operations and maintenance procedure development, and
evaluation.
Background
The Supplemental Treatment Test and Demonstration Project is a research and development
project with the goal ofproving the suitability ofbulk vitrification for treating LAW from tank
farms for final disposal. In 2002, the DOE and CH2M HILL evaluated three supplemental
treatment technologies for LAW:
• Cast stone
• Bulk vitrification
• Steam reforming.
Bulk vitrification was tentatively selected as the most promising of the three technologies at the
Hanford Site and CH2M HILL was asked to perform additional full-scale tests with actual tank
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waste to fully evaluate bulk vitrification. The DBVS project is pennitted by the Washington
State Department ofEcology (Ecology) under a research development and demonstration pennit
issued in December 2007 (Final Dangerous and/or Mixed Waste Research,· Development, and
Demonstration (RD&D) Permitfor the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification Facility, Rev. 1, Permit
No: WA 789000896'?). Retrieval of tank SST 241-S-109 waste is authorized by Ecology's
February 2005 approval ofRPP-18812, TankS-109 Partial Waste Retrieval Functions and
Requirement/.
The Supplemental Treatment Test and Demonstration Project has two components. One
component is the DBVS, which will produce large containers ofvitrified waste from SST
241-S-109. The other component is the SST 241-S-109 PWRS, which will retrieve waste from
SST 241-S-109 and send the waste to the DBVS. The description of the SST 241-S-109 PWRS
process systems is discussed in RPP-13033, Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis8 (Tank
Farms DSA), and the controls associated with this phase of the waste retrieval and delivery to the
DBVS are included within HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, Tank Farms Technical Safety
Requirement/.
The immediate project benefit is demonstration of a treatment method which could immobilize
significant amounts of waste contaminated with mobile, long-lived radionuclides in a timely
fashion to reduce risk to the public and the environment.
The general waste fonn qualification objectives for operation of the DBVS are threefold.
1. Ensure that the waste packages produced in the operations of the research, development,
and demonstration facility will meet long-tenn perfonnance criteria and can be disposed
at the Hanford IDF as treated LAW.
2. Ensure that the necessary data are collected at the required intervals to support future
milestone decisions and future perfonnance assessments.
3. Supply sufficient data to ensure that a production product control strategy can be
implemented that is practical for the several thousand waste packages that might be
produced in the follow-on production facility while supplying the necessary controls to
ensure waste fonn quality.
Operations will be conducted as campaigns. A campaign plan will be prepared for each
campaign that defines the type, quantity, and sequence of data acquisition such that Objectives 2
and 3 are satisfied (DOE/ORP-2003-23, Research, Development, and Demonstration Permit
Applicationfor a Bulk Vitrification Test and Demonstration Facility, Section 5.211).
Details of the process parameters used for operation during these campaigns will be described in
campaign plans and process memos. Table I provides a summary of currently planned full-scale
campaigns in the DBVS, indicating the general purpose and estimating the number of glass
containers expected to be produced by each test group.
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Table 1. Summary of Currently Planned Full-Scale Tests in the Demonstration Bulk
Vitrification System.
Estimated
Group name Group number of Purpose
number glass
containers
Full-Scale Simulant 40 5 Verify that the results obtained in engineering scale tests can be
Demonstrations scaled to a full-size system using waste simulant. Includes
rhenium spikes to help determine the amount ofvolatilization that
occurs at full-scale relative to engineering scale tests.
Full-Scale Hot 41 I Verify that SST 24l-S-109 waste can be processed in a full-size
Demonstration system using a fraction ofactual waste combined with chemical
sitnulant to mimic the baseline sodium loading. Begins validation
ofsitnulant test and supports determining the fate of technetium
in a full-scale unit.
Full-Scale Hot 42 5 Evaluate the effect ofvarying the quantity of SST 241-S-109
Ramp-Up waste used in the waste feed on waste form quality. Completed
when the waste feed is comprised of 100% SST 241-S-109 waste
and the baseline operating conditions have been established. Also
supports development ofwaste form qualification strategies.
Full-Scale Hot 43 5 Establish the variability ofglass produced while operating at
Baseline constant (baseline) operating conditions. Also supports
Establishment development ofwaste form qualification strategies.
Full-Scale Hot 44 15 Verify the size ofa process operating window that will produce
Process Operational an acceptable waste package. While minimizing the waste feed
Window variability, glassformer, waste package configuration, and
process variables are varied to determine the effects on the final
waste form. Tests will also verify that procedures to deal with
interrupted melts work as expected and support development of
waste form qualification strategies.
Full-Scale Hot Feed 45 10 Verif'y that the process can treat other portions of the waste feed
Envelope envelope by adjusting the SST 241-S-109 waste chemical
Verification composition with simulants. Glassformer and process conditions
may be varied, as necessary. Also supports development ofwaste
form qualification strategies.
Full-Scale Hot 46 10 Verify that optimized glass formulations produce acceptable
Process waste forms when processed at full scale with actual waste.
Improvement Supports development ofwaste form qualification strategies.
Notes:
Based on test purpose descriptions in PNNL-15048, Waste-Form Qualification Compliance Strategyfor Bulk
Vitrification, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington.
SST ~ single-shell tank.
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Facility Overview
This section provides a briefoverview ofDBVS configuration and the processes perfonned to
accomplish vitrification of tank waste.
The DBVS receives waste from SST 241·S·109, which is located in the 200 West Area of the
Hanford Site. After receipt, DBVS mixes the waste with glass-fonning minerals, dries the
mixture, and uses a process referred to as In-Container Vitrification (ICV)" to vitrify the
radioactive waste. A simplified diagram ofthe DBVS process is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Process.
The main process systems ofthe DBVS are the following:
• Clean Soil and Glass Fonners Preparation System
• Waste Receipt System
• Waste Dryer System
• Dried Waste Transfer System (DWTS)
• ICV System
• ICV (In-Container Vitrification) is a trademark ofAMEC, Inc., London, England.
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• Core Sampling System
• Off-Gas Treatment System (OGTS)
• Off-Gas Treatment System Emergency Bypass System (OGTS Bypass System)
• Secondary Waste Storage System
• Temporary Immobilized Low-Activity Waste (lLAW) Storage.
Overall Mission Objectives
The DBVS approximates one of the six parallel process lines for the follow-on production
vitrification facility described in RPP-16215, Production Bulk Vitrification System, Preliminary
Engineering Reportll • The demonstration is intended to verify in-container, bottom-up melting
of radioactive waste as a viable technology. The demonstration mission will last approximately
18 months and vitrify approximately 200,000 gal of SST 241-S-1 09 saltcake waste diluted to
approximately 5 M sodium (600,000 gal diluted volume) producing up to 50 containers of
product.
Facility Siting
The site location for the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site is shown in Figure 2. The DBVS
location within the 200 West Area is shown in Figure 3. The site is located immediately west of
the 241-S Tank Farm in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site. The wastes planned for
treatment are currently stored in SST 241-S-109, a 750,000-gal SST located in the 200 West
Area.
The site is west of the existing 241-S Tank Farm fence, in an area that has already been disturbed
and will support process and ancillary equipment for the DBVS. The proposed location allows
close access to existing electrical and raw water utilities, telephone, and Hanford local area
network services. Surface materials consist of soft sand and soil that are free from surface
contamination. The site is sufficiently level to provide for equipment placement with minimum
grading or excavation. Cooper Avenue, which runs north-south on the west side of the
241-S Tank Farm, provides ingress and egress for the area.
Facility Configuration
The DBVS facility consists of a number ofprocess trailers, skids, enclosures, and staging areas.
The major DBVS facility structures and their relative placement can be seen in Figures 4a and
4b.
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Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Components
The DBVS consists of trailer-mounted and skid-mounted equipment suitable for field
installation, operation, and removal at the completion of the project. The system includes the
major components, systems, and areas listed below.
The general arrangement of the following components (see Figures 4a and 4b) includes:
• ICV Box Preparation and Assembly Enclosure Area
• Waste Receipt System
• Clean Soil and Glass Formers Handling System
• Waste Transfer Pump Skid and Liquid Waste Staging Tanks
• Waste Dryer System
• Waste Dryer Chilled Water and Stearn Supply Systems
• DWTS
• ICV System
• OGTS
• OGTS Bypass System
• OGTS Stack and Stack Monitoring
• OGTS Treatment Chilled Water System
• OGTS Treatment Chemical Storage and Supply (caustic)
• Secondary Waste Storage System
• Temporary ILAW Storage.
Support Systems
Support systems are systems that are required to operate the DBVS, but are not directly involved
with the process. The support systems consist of the following:
• Control trailer
• Personnel contamination control and survey station
• Backup generator
• Stearn, compressed air, and filtered water systems
• Diesel generator fuel tanks.
• Power Module, Medium Voltage, 480 volts alternating current (Vac) Critical Loads
• 480 Vac General Loads trailers.
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Safety Analyses
Pre-Conceptual and Conceptual Phases
With the commencement ofpre-conceptual design in 2003, the first hazards analyses were
conducted. A hazards and operability analysis (HAZOP) was completed in October 2003, which
resulted in some design changes to the project (e.g., relocation of the waste dryer from an
elevation directly over the ICV container to alongside). At that time, the project was primarily
focused on proving the viability of the bulk vitrification technology rather than the method for
drying and transporting the waste to the ICV. As a result, the DBVS was seen as more of a test
than a project, and it was placed on a fast track for design, safety anal1zsis, construction, and
operation, rather than the "critical decision" process of DOE 0 413.3 2, Program and Project
Management/or the Acquisition o/Capital Assets. An overall schedule from early 2004 showed
the project being built in 2005, operated through 2006, and the decontamination and
decommissioning completed at the end of2007.
At the 30% design point in April 2004, another HAZOP was conducted because the
non-prototypic systems ofthe DBVS (including the waste receipt, waste drying, waste delivery,
and OGTS) had developed to the point where the hazards could be determined more fully, and
outside regulators had shown more interest in these systems than initially thought, forcing the
project to shift its focus from a technology demonstration to a process demonstration. The
original qualitative judgment from the safety analysts was that the project posed a low
radiological risk (which would be borne out in later, quantitative analyses) and only a facility
worker risk for toxicological exposures from toxic off-gases such as NOx (this judgment would
be shown to be significantly understated during later analyses).
In the beginning, the hazards analyses for the project showed that there were five accident
scenarios that would require control decision (others would be added later as the design
matured):
• Flanunable Gas
• Release of Toxic Off-Gases (e.g., NOx)
• Release of Dried Waste
• Waste Transfer Leak
• Aboveground Tank Failure.
The offsite consequences were considered to be bounded by similar accidents from the tank
farms, so it was assumed that the equipment would be safety significant and not safety class.
Because of the initial premise of a technology rather than a process demonstration, and the
original judgment as to the low collocated and offsite public risk, the regulators felt the design of
the support systems to the ICV containers was less robust than necessary, and the systems'
compliance with requirements of DOE 0 420. lA, Facility Sa/ety13, was continually challenged
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throughout 2004 and into early 2005. The major point of contention was compliance with the
"multiple barriers" requirements of the DOE order.
Revision 0 of the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis
The first Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) (RPP-23429, Demonstration Bulk
Vitrification System Preliminary Documented Saftty Analysis, Revision 014) for the project was
submitted in January 2005, and approved by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River
Protection (ORP) in March 2005. This PDSA was envisioned to eventually become an addendum
to the Tank Farms DSA, so its accident analyses was written as a "delta" to analyses performed
for tank farms, following the format of DOE-STD-3009-94 (i.e., differences in frequency and
consequence to the suite ofaccidents analyzed for tank farms where possible, with unique DBVS
accidents addressed separately). The hazard category for the project was divided, at that point,
into two phases. During the first phase, the project was considered to be "less than Hazard
Category 3" due to a very limited material at risk (MAR) of approximately 1,000 gal; and in the
second phase, it was considered to be Hazard Category 2, due to its physical connection to tank
farms (an inventory of the radiological constituents within DBVS was not performed).
Subsequent to the approval of the PDSA for the project, the following events occurred during the
remainder of 2005 and 2006.
• A basic analysis assumption for toxic off-gas confinement upon a loss of active
ventilation, in which a passive ventilation path at the ICV container inlet was to be
established through an inlet stack (which would have no valving or other blockages), was
found to be faulty. This was because of poor communications between the various
engineering groups for the project (which were located in Trail and Vancouver, British
Columbia, as well as in Richland, Washington). During the transition from active to
passive ventilation, it was well understood that the ICV would experience a period of
transition in which the pressure in the box would go slightly positive. What was not
understood was that the design of the ICV lid seal was for negative pressure (i.e.,
restricting in-leakage), but not for positive pressure. As a result, this transition period
would result in toxicological consequences at 100 meters above Temporary Emergency
Exposure Limit (TEEL)-3 (i.e., high onsite toxicological consequences). This, combined
with the recommendation from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB
2004-2) regarding active ventilation controls for confinement, developed into a
safety-significant active ventilation system for the DBVS (emergency bypass ventilation
system), even though the facility remained within Hazard Category 3.
• An external review determined that the hazards analysis process needed more facility
worker focus, and so a Process Hazards and Operability Analysis (prHOA) process was
instituted via RPP-PLAN-26909, Supplemental Treatment Test and Demonstration
Facility Process Hazard and Operation Analysis Plan lS• This new hazards analysis
process was used to review the DBVS design and planned operations from August
through December 2005.
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• The project received correspondence from its subcontractor in which projected cost
estimates predicted over-runs and significant schedule delays. This was reported to ORP
and ORP, in tum, directed compliance with a CH2M HILL recovery plan. In addition, the
project was to be placed under the requirements of DOE 0 413.3 and was directed to
prepare and receive approval of critical decision packages per that order.
• An independent teclmical review panel was commissioned by CH2M HILL and ORP in
January 2006, to recommend improvements to the vitrification process, specifically with
the regard to the teclmetium mass balance. The ability to show that all of the teclmetium
would be immobilized within the glass matrix had not been accomplished during
engineering and full-scale testing to this point and was crucial to the environmental
permitting for the project. The changes coming from this panel drove several process
changes (e.g., cold cap management and glass-former material recipe changes), and
ultimately would take through the summer of2007 to finally resolve through several
more full-scale melt tests at the Hom Rapids test site adjacent to the Hanford reservation.
All of the process and design changes deriving from these test results needed to be
reflected in updated safety analyses.
• In May 2006, as the design was nearing completion (the design was due for completion in
July 2006, and the PDSA due for submittal in September), an expert review panel was
commissioned by CH2M HILL to review the DBVS project. This panel had just
completed a similar review on the Waste Treatment Plant being designed and constructed
by Bechtel National, Inc., on the Hanford Site. This review was very thorough and lasted
until September 2006. Several changes resulted from this review, but the evaluations and
incorporation of these changes were not completed until after the design was complete on
July 28, 2006, and were not reflected in the revision to the PDSA submitted for ORP
review and approval on October 19, 2006.
Revision 1 of the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis
The revision to the PDSA submitted to ORP in October 2006, was significantly changed from
the previous revision submitted in 2005. The major changes included the following.
• The DBVS PDSA was no longer envisioned to be an addendum to the Tank Fanns DSA.
As a result, the hazard and accident analyses were performed again to derive the
accidents directly from the hazards associated with the DBVS facility, rather than relying
on a "delta" analysis from tank fanns. The programmatic chapters of the PDSA continued
to reference the Tank Fanns DSA as the DBVS facility shared SMPs with the Tank Fann
facility. The PDSA remained in the format of DOE-STD-3009-94, though there was
some question at the time regarding whether the format should be shifted to follow
DOE-STD-1189-2008. It was determined during discussions with ORP that the format
should not be changed.
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• Offsite radiological analyses were perfonned for the unique Davs accident scenarios,
which corroborated earlier assumptions that the offsite risk evaluation guideline was not
challenged, and allocation of controls as safety significant rather than safety class was
appropriate.
• Where chemical inventory exceeded the Threshold Quantities in 29 CFR 1910.119,
"Process Safety Management ofHighly Hazardous Chemicals,,16, or 40 CFR 68, "Risk
Management Plans,,17 (or 40 CFR 355, "Emergency Planning and Notification,,18, ifnot
listed in 29 CFR 1910.119), a quantitative or qualitative analysis was perfonned to
evaluate potential chemical exposures. The elements of Process Safety Management were
implemented as applicable. (Revision 0 of the PDSA explained that no chemicals
exceeded the threshold quantities of29 CFR 1910.119.)
• Where chemical inventory exceeded the reportable quantities in 40 CFR 302,
"Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification,,19 additional hazard analysis was
required if significant chemical consequences to facility workers or collocated workers
could be reasonably expected. The purpose ofevaluating potential significant chemical
consequences was threefold: (1) to identify preventive and mitigative controls that may
be an opportunity for improvement of the final process design or operational procedures;
(2) to evaluate the adequacy of the chemical management program and other SMPs to
control the hazard; and (3) to apply the DOE-STD-3009-94 safety-significant structures,
systems, and components (SSC) criteria. SSC designation or specific administrative
controls (SAC) based on worker safety for non-Standard Industrial Hazard (SIH)
chemical hazards were limited to those whose failure was estimated to result in prompt
worker fatality, serious injuries to workers, or significant chemical exposures. SSCs and
administrative controls (AC) were considered for elevation to safety SSC or SAC status
for SIH involving quantities of industrial chemicals that had the potential for significant
facility worker consequence. However, safety SSC designation or SACs for industrial
chemical SIH were only appropriate if significant improvement in worker protection
could be realized beyond what was provided through contractually mandated SMPs and
compliance with national consensus codes and standards such as those established by the
American Society ofMechanical Engineers.
• Where chemical inventory did not exceed the reportable quantities of 40 CFR 302,
further hazard analysis was not necessary. The adequacy ofhazard controls provided by
SMPs or other implemented controls was confinned.
Examples ofconditions where a significant consequence to the facility worker were
considered for safety-significant SSCs or SACs included:
Energetic releases of high concentrations of radiological or toxic chemical
materials where the facility worker would nonnally be immediately present and
therefore unable to take self-protective actions
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- Deflagrations or explosions within process equipment or
confinement/containment structures or vessels where grievous injury or death to a
facility worker may result from the fragmentation ofthe process equipment
failing or the confinement (or containment) with the facility worker close by
- Chemical or thermal bums to a facility worker that could reasonably cover a
significant portion ofthe facility worker's body where self-protective actions are
not reasonably available due to the speed ofthe event or where there may be no
reasonable warning to the facility worker of the hazardous condition
Exposures to radiological or toxic materials of sufficient magnitude that death or
ongoing large-scale medical intervention may reasonably be expected to result
Leaks from process systems where asphyxiation ofa facility worker normally
present may result.
• The DBVS was evaluated to be a Hazard Category 3, based on radiological inventory and
fissile material inventory, as outlined in the methodology of DOE-STD-l027-92, Hazard
Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order
5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Report;o.
• The source term assumptions were adjusted to be more consistent with the facility design
(i.e., in-situ values for radiological and toxicological constituents used in the previous
revision were replaced with more realistic values deriving from the diluted retrieval
effiuent from the waste tank in tank farms). This source term would be protected via
technical safety requirement (TSR).
• The ICV container vacuum would be assured by a safety-significant OGTS bypass
system.
• Additional safety-significant SSCs were designated (solely driven by facility worker
protection from "significant" facility worker hazards).
• Whenever SMPs were relied upon for risk reduction, key elements of these programs
would be identified during DSA development as SACs in accordance with
DOE-STD-1186-2004.
Preliminary Safety Design Report (Revision I-A of the Preliminary Documented Safety
Analysis)
In July 2006, DOE 0 413.3 was revised to DOE 0 413.3A, which, among other changes,
changed the nomenclature of the safety documentation for CD-l and CD-2 to "Conceptual
Safety Design Report (CSDR)" and "Preliminary Safety Design Report (PSDR)," respectively.
The project had previously been directed to follow the requirements of the order, and had already
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received approvals for CD-O and CD-I. The CD-2 package was scheduled for submittal to ORP
and DOE-Headquarters during the swnmer of2007, and discussions with ORP during the
autumn of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 centered on the required fonnat for the next revision
of the PDSA for inclusion in the CD-2 package.
DOE 0 413.3A referenced DOE-STD-1189-2008 as the source ofinfonnation regarding the
fonn and content of a PSDR. However, some ofthe DBVS design was completed to a degree
beyond that required for a PSDR in DOE-STD-1189-2008 (i.e. remained unchanged from the
PDSA submittal in October 2006) and other areas had been changed from the "final design"
analyzed in that PDSA. ORP and CH2M HILL agreed that CH2M HILL would not completely
revise the PDSA, but would supplement the PDSA with PSDR-level analyses on those areas of
the design that had been modified subsequent to the previous design freeze date ofJuly 2006.
The design changed substantially in the latter half of 2006 and the ftrst half of 2007 for several
reasons: (1) recommendations from the expert review panel; (2) results of a value engineering
facilitated session conducted by CH2M HILL and ORP; and (3) refonnulation of the
glass-fonning minerals and additives by the Paciftc Northwest National Laboratory to address
radionuclide mass balance issues ftrst discussed in 2005. As a result of these inputs to the
project, the following substantial changes were made to the design in 2007.
• The OOTS NOx reduction approach was modifted from a tail-end catalytic reduction
process to a head-end thennal process. The Ammonia Oas Supply System and selective
catalytic reduction unit were eliminated. A propane-ftred thennal oxidizer was added
upstream ofthe gas scrubber and downstream of the sintered metal ftlters with an
accompanying gas storage and supply system.
• The ICV feed material was modifted by addition ofcellulose ftber and glass-fonning
minerals to the glass-fonning material supplied to the waste dryer. This change was made
to eliminate the migration ofmolten ionic salts (a mechanism by which radionuclides
were carried outside the glass matrix and thus not immobilized) through the ICV
container refractory barrier.
• The DWTS was changed from a vacuum blower-driven pneumatic system to a
mechanical auger system. Two vertical and two horizontal centerless augers replaced the
pneumatic transport system. In addition, a feed hopper was installed under the waste
dryer to supply the vertical augers.
• The design was also modified to fully enclose the Melt Area Enclosure structure, adding
fans and ftlters to ventilate this structure.
• The size of the OOTS was reduced, mainly because of the replacement of the venturi
scrubber (for acid gas removal) to a packed bed scrubber.
CH2M-36385-FP Page 17 of29
• The inclusion of the cellulose in the glass-fonner mixture added a new accident for
analysis in this revision, Organic Nitrate Reactions.
• Incomplete infonnation was available on several hazards at the time of the submittal of
the PSDR, and these were identified as "items requiring further evaluation." These items
included the following.
- The inclusion ofcellulose in the dried waste and glass-fonning materials mixture
could affect flammable gas generation in this mixture through increased
thennolysis of the organic material. This required testing at the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory. Results showed that there was a significant increase in the
generation of flammable gases, particularly in the waste dryer (time to 25% ofthe
lower flammability limit dropped from well over 1 year to less than 1 day).
The inclusion of cellulose in the glass-fonning materials presented a hazard of
confined dust cloud explosions. Testing was perfonned at Fauske & Assoc., LLC
to detennine the combustibility of various percentages of dried waste and
hydrogen content in the glass-fonner mixture. Results showed a large margin
between the flowsheet values ofdried waste (approximately 11 wt %) and
combustibility limits.
The inclusion of cellulose in the dried waste and glass-fonning materials mixture
presented a hazard of entraining significant moisture in the feed material to the
melt with subsequent steam generation. Engineering calculations showed that
with approximately 25% moisture in the waste feed delivered to the ICV; the
resultant steam fonnation could overwhelm the ventilation systems and cause a
ground-level release of toxic off-gases. As a result, additional engineered and
ACs were placed on the waste dryer and DWTS (e.g., a control to prevent the
liquid waste inlet valves to the dryer and the dried waste discharge valve from
being opened at the same time, and a process control on moisture content of the
discharged dried waste).
The inclusion of cellulose in the dried waste and glass-fonning materials mixture
presented a hazard of exothermic organic-nitrate reactions in areas of the plant
where this was undesirable (this exothennic reaction was desired in the ICV as a
de-nitration reaction for control of the molten ionic salts). Particular areas where
this reaction needed to be prevented were the waste dryer, waste hopper below the
dryer, the DWTS, and the DOTS sintered metal filters. Data obtained from
full-scale testing at the Hom Rapids Test Center showed that the organic levels in
the carry-over material into the DOTS sintered metal filters was significantly
reduced, reducing the hazard ofexothennic reaction in this area, and the geometry
of the DWTS (surface area to volume ratio) reduced the likelihood ofa bulk
temperature sufficient to induce the reaction in this area of the plant. However,
analysis with Fauske & Assoc., LLC, showed that controls were required in the
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waste dryer and waste hopper. TSR controls were, therefore, placed on these areas
to limit their temperatures below potential onset temperatures for the reaction.
On March 30, 2007, CH2M HILL submitted Revision I-A of the PDSA (Revision I of the
POSA was still in review by ORP, but the design had continued to evolve after submittal due to
internal and external recommendations). Revision I-A included appendices with PSDR-Ievel
analyses on the "deltas" of the design, including sections on Fires and Explosions (resulting
mainly from the inclusion of the propane thermal oxidizer), Dried Waste Releases (changes
resulted from mechanical auger delivery system rather than a pneumatic transport), and an
analysis of Organic Nitrate Reactions (the addition of the cellulose "fuel" for these reactions had
elevated this accident scenario to one for which controls were now required).
Figure 5 provides a graphic representation of the parallel development of the project design and
safety analysis.
Safety Analysis Development with Design
Expert Review Panel
MIS issue resolution
_____, ~uly 2~ 200~1--- ~,rDesign l-------IlFinal Desig~L DeSIgn J ~hange~
ctober 200-1-_--1
PDSA
March 2007 PDSA L--i~~~~ith PSDR a endice~ 0-3 PDS
Haz Cat 3
Bypass Vent System
PrHOA
Addt'l worker controls
Deltas:
-Cellulose addition
-Mechanical auger
-Propane oxidizer
Open Issues Resolved:
-Flam Gas generation
-Moisture transfer
-Cellulose-Nitrate
-Dust Explosion potential
Figure 5. Design and Safety Analysis Development.
On June 19,2007, ORP issued a Preliminary Safety Validation Report for Revision I-A of the
PDSA/PSDR with eight conditions of approval.
I. The Tank Fann Contractor (TFC) shall prepare and submit to ORP a PDSA incorporating
results of the hazards analyses, accident analyses, safety system design information, and
safety control strategies of final design in support of CD-3.
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2. The TFC is directed to assign the same safety function to the hydraulic piping and hoses
for the Waste Dryer Hydraulic Power Module that present a similar hydraulic spray fire
hazard as the mechanical joints in the hydraulic system. The safety function is to protect
safety-significant primary confinement and the waste dryer skid (ISO container)
structural supports against the effects of a hydraulic spray fire, thus decreasing the
frequency ofradioactive and hazardous material releases by limiting the damage caused
by the fire.
3. In the next revision of the Preliminary Fire Hazards Analysis, the TFC shall consider how
the following fire parameters/phenomena affect the structural supports of the Melt Area
Enclosure and OGTS, safety-significant primary confinement (both dry waste and
gaseous effluent) and the achievement of safe shutdown:
• Flashover
• Flame Impingement
• Temperature
• Duration
• Propagation
• Soot
• Type, amount, and location ofcombustible.
In the event that SACs are deemed adequate, in lieu of engineered safety fire detection
and suppression systems, the SAC shall be quantifiable and include a basis for
implementation as required by DOE-STD-1186-2004. The resulting new controls, or the
basis for implementation ofSAC, shall be provided in the next revision of the PDSA.
4. The safety basis control strategy for the use ofpropane to fire the Thermal Oxidation
System Burner shall be modified to identify robust safety related independent layers of
protection intended to either reduce the frequency or consequence of the identified
hazardous conditions associated with the use ofpropane within the operations area of the
facility by addressing the following potential hazardous conditions:
• Unconfmed vapor explosions
• Fire
• Jet flame
• Fireball.
5. The Thermal Oxidation System Burner shall be designed to meet all applicable
requirements ofNFPA 85, Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code21 • All safety
systems shall be designed to meet the appropriate safety classifications. The TFC, in the
next revision of the PDSA, shall identify robust safety related controls, using a systematic
process, to either reduce the frequency or consequence associated with the use ofpropane
in the DBVS facility by addressing unconfmed vapor explosions, fire, jet flames, and
fireballs resulting from the use ofpropane.
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6. Defense-in-Depth controls and features shall be revised as required by DOE 0 420.IA in
the PDSA for submittal in support of CD-3.
7. The PDSA prepared for CD-3 shall incorporate the requirements ofNFPA 69, Explosion
Prevention SystemJ2, as applicable, as the safety basis control strategy for flanunable gas
hazards.
8. The revision of the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) analysis prepared for
the PDSA prior to CD-3 shall provide detailed technical bases for all aspects of the
shielding strategy planned for the facility. The PDSA shall contain an adequate summary
of these technical bases.
Revision 2 of the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis
For the remainder of 2007, the project design continued with hazards analyses on changes
deriving from enhancements and resolutions of outstanding issues. Also, ORP and CH2M HILL
agreed upon testing scope and methodologies in the areas of flanunable gas generation,
exothermic reactions, and dust combustibility for the cellulose addition to the glass-former
mixture. External reviews of the design and safety analysis continued, but no additional
significant changes resulted. ORP and CH2M HILL discussed and agreed upon the path-forward
for closure of the conditions of approval.
Design for the project was completed in March 2008, and results ofall the testing have been
received. Revision 2 of the PDSA is scheduled for submittal to ORP in May, 2008, as part of the
CD-3 package for the project. Funding levels for the project have been decreased in recent years,
and funding for fiscal year 2009 has been cut, awaiting a decision by DOE on the best choice of
technology to be applied to supplemental treatment of the Hanford Site waste (i.e., DBVS or an
additional LAW melter at the Waste Treatment Plant). Because of this, the PDSA will be
reviewed by ORP upon receipt, but an approval is not anticipated until the decision on the
technology has been made and funding to the project has been re-established.
Table 2 shows the draft controls for each of the analyzed accidents in Revision 2 of the PDSA.
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Table 2. Summary of Safety Structures, Systems, and Components and Technical Safety
Reauirements for Renresentative Accidents. (5 sheets)
No. Representative Safety structures, systems, and Technical safety reqnirements'
accident components
I. Fires and explosions SS: Waste dryer ISO freight LCO: Waste Dryer ISO Freight Container and
container water mist Hydraulic Power Module Water Mist
system Systems
SS: Waste dryer hydraulic LCO: Propane Monitoring System
power module water mist LCO: Flame Loss Interlock
system SAC: ICV Container Transporter Restrictions
SS: Waste dryer hydraulic SAC: Fire Protection Program
power module hydraulic SAC: Cellulose Limitpiping, hoses, and spray
SAC: Vehicle Barrier Controlsshields
SS: Diesel generator fuel tank SAC: Hoisting and Rigging Program
and fuel line curbing Design Features
SS: Propane supply system • Location ofthe waste dryer steam
piping supply skid and fuel storage tank
SS: Propane supply system • Location of the propane storage tank
stop-check valve
• Topography of the propane storage
SS: Propane monitoring tank site and/or barriers
system
SS: Propane supply system
shutoff valve
SS: Flame loss interlock
SS: Vehicle barriers
2. Flammable gas SS: Waste staging tanks LCO: Transfer Leak Detection Systems
accidents SS: Waste dryer LCO: ICV Container Inlet Air
SS: Transfer leak detection Low-FlowlLow-Vacuum Interlockd
systems SAC: Waste Dryer Controls
SS: ICV container inlet air • Flammable gas
low-flowllow-vacuum SAC: Industrial Safety Program
interlockd
SS: Waste dryer vent flow
path valves'
3. Waste transfer leaks SS: Waste staging tanks LCO: Transfer Leak Detection Systems
SS: Waste transfer primary LCO: Backflow Preventers
piping systems LCO: Waste Staging Tank High Level
SS: Waste staging tank valve LCO: Waste Dryer Load Cell High Weight
manifold boxes SAC: Waste Receipt Pump Skid (ISO
SS: Waste receipt pump skid Container) Controls
(ISO container)
• Waste receipt pump skid doors'SS: Hose-in-hose transfer line SAC: Waste Dryer Controls
systems
• Waste dryer "openings" and seals'SS: Waste dryer
SS: Waste dryer skid (ISO • Waste dryer sintered metal filter
container)
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Table 2. Summary of Safety Structures, Systems, and Components and Technical Safety
Requirements for Representative Accidents. (5 sheets)
No. Representative Safety structnres, systems, and Tecbnical safety requirements'
accident components
SS: Transfer leak detection SAC: Waste Dryer Skid (ISO Container)
systems Controls
SS: Backflow preventers • Waste dryer skid doors'
SS: Isolation valves for double SAC: Transfer Controls
valve isolation
• Independent verification ofdouble
SS: Waste staging tank high valve isolation
level interlocks and
• Waste staging tank valve manifold
alarms box covers'
SS: Waste dryer load cell high
• Material balance
weight alarm
SAC: Administrative Lock Controls
SS: Waste dryer sintered SAC: Vehicle Barrier Controls
metal filter
SS: Vehicle barriers SAC: Hoisting and Rigging Program
SS: Waste sample bottle SAC: Emergency Preparedness Program
SS: Drum filling station SAC: Drum Filling Station Controls
SS: I" Stage Sintered Metal • Drum Filling Station Doors
Filter Housing SAC: Sintered Metal Filter Flushing Controls
SS: Inlet and Outlet valves to • Volume limit on flush water
I" Stage Sintered Metal • Inlet and outlet valve controls
Filter
SS: 2m! Stage Sintered Metal
Filter Housing
SS: Inlet and Outlet valves to
2m! Stage Sintered Metal
Filter
4. Aboveground tank SS: Waste staging tanks SAC: Waste Staging Tank Controls
failures SS: Waste dryer • Waste staging tank pressure/vacuum
SS: Vehicle barriers reliefvalves'
SAC: Waste Dryer Controls
• Waste dryer "openings" and seals·
SAC: Vehicle Barrier Controls
SAC: Hoisting and Rigging Program
SAC: Freeze Protection Controls'
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Table 2. Summary of Safety Structures, Systems, and Components and Technical Safety
Rel1uirements for Renresentative Accidents. (5 sheets)
No. Representative Safety structures, systems, and Techuical safety requirements'
accident componeuts
5. Dried waste releases SS: Waste dryer LCO: Transfer Leak Detection Systems
SS: Transfer leak detection LCO: MAEB Ventilation System HEPA
system in the waste dryer Filters
skid (ISO container) LCO: ICV Container Inlet Air
SS: DWTS primary Low-Flow/Low-Vacuum Interlock
confinement structures' LCO: ICV Container Lid High Temperature
SS: MAEB ventilation system SAC: Waste Dryer Controls
HEPA filters
• Waste dryer "openings" and seals'
SS: ICV containers SAC: ICV Container Controls
SS: ICV container inlet air
• DWTS chute connections to the ICVlow-flowllow-vacuum
containerinterlockd
SS: DWTS feed isolation SAC: Vehicle Barrier Controls
valves SAC: Hoisting and Rigging Program
SS: ICV container lid high
temperature alarm
SS: OGTS confmement
structuresc
ss: Off-gas exhaust stack
SS: Vehicle barriers
SS: ICV container guide rails
6. Toxic off-gas releases SS: ICV containers LCO: ICV Container Lid High Temperature
SS: ICV container lid high LCO: Off-Gas Quencher High Temperature
temperature alarm Interlock
SS: DWTS and top-off soil LCO: Off-Gas Quencher Emergency Water
chutes' Supply System
SS: OGTS confmement LCO: OGTS Bypass System
structuresc LCO: ICV Container Inlet Air
SS: Off-gas quencher high Low-FlowlLow-Vacuum Interlock
temperature interlock LCO: Waste Dryer Feed/Discharge Interlock
SS: Off-gas quencher SAC: Waste Dryer Controls
emergency water supply
• Dried waste moisture limitsystem
• Isolation of filtered water to the
SS: Propane supply system
waste dryer
shutoff valve SAC: ICV Container Controls
SS: Off-gas exhaust stack • DWTS and top-off soil chute
connections and the OGTS
SS: OGTS bypass system" connection to the ICV container
SS: ICV container inlet air SAC: Vehicle Barrier Controls
low-flowllow-vacuum SAC: Hoisting and Rigging Programinterlock'
SS: OGTS bypass system inlet
isolation valves
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Table 2. Summary of Safety Structures, Systems, and Components and Technical Safety
Requirements for Representative Accidents. (S sheets)
No. Representative Safety structures, systems, and Technical safety requirements'
accident components
SS: ICV container off-gas
outlet isolation valves
SS: DWTS feed isolation
valves
SS: Lower top-off soil air lock
valves
SS: OGTS air inlet valves'
SS: Waste dryer
feed/discharge interlock
SS: Vehicle barriers
7 Organic-nitrate reaction SS: Waste dryer high LCO: Waste Dryer High Temperature
temperature alarm LCO: Dried Waste Feed Hopper High
SS: Dried waste feed hopper Temperature
high temperature alarm SAC: Cellulose Limit
8. Process chemical None required None required
releases
9. Other releases None required None required
10. External events' None required SAC: Emergency Preparedness Program
II. Natural events' None required SAC: Emergency Preparedness Program
Notes:
'In addition to the TSRs listed for each representative accident, SAC: Source Term Controls protects the source
term assumptions in RPP-CALC·30596 used in the accident analysis, and SAC: Instrumentation Controls controls
instrumentation used to verify parameters to comply with the TSRs. The TSRs also establish the minimum
operations shift complement necessary to respond to safety-significant system alarms.
"The safety-significant waste dryer vent flow path valves include the waste dryer inlet and outlet valves to vent
the waste dryer through the vacuum blower to the OGTS or the OGTS bypass system.
'The safety-significant DWTS primary confinement structures include the structures (e.g., piping, valves, dried
waste feed hopper, dried waste vertical and horizontal augers, waste feed chutes, waste feed port assemblies) that
provide the confmement of waste during its transfer from the waste dryer to the ICV container.
"The safety-significant ICV container inlet air low-flow/low-vacuum interlock includes the ICV container inlet
air low-flow and low-vacuum instrumentation, and the interlocks to open the OGTS bypass system inlet isolation
valves (2) and to close the ICV container inlet and off-gas outlet isolation valves (2), the DWTS feed isolation
valves (2), the lower top-offsoil air lock valves (4), the OGTS air inlet valves (5), and the propane supply system
shutoffvalve.
'The safety-significant OGTS confinement structures include the piping, valves, and OGTS component
housings (e.g., sintered metal filters, thermal oxidizer, quencherlscrubber, HEPA and HEGA filters, and exhaust
fans) that provide confinement oftoxic off-gas (NOx) and dried waste particulates from the ICV container to the
off-gas exhaust stack.
"rhe safety-significant DWTS and top-off soil chutes include the structures (e.g., piping, valves) from the ICV
container to and including the DWTS feed isolation valves and the lower top-off soil air lock valves.
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ITable 2. Summary of Safety Structures, Systems, and Components and Technical Safety
Requirements for Representative Accidents. (5 sheets)
IN
Representative ISafety structures, systems, and •
o. accident components Technical safety requirements
8The safety-significant OGTS bypass system includes the confmement structures (e.g., piping; valves;
knock-out pot, HEPA filter, and fan housings) that provide confinement of toxic off-gas (NOx) and dried waste
particulates from the connection to the ICV container to the off-gas exhaust stack; the components/systems (e.g.,
fans, UPS, ATS, backnp generator) required to maintain a vacuum in the ICV container for postulated scenarios that
result is loss ofOGTS flow to the ICV container; the knock-out pot that protect the HEPA filters from plugging, and
the main OGTS inlet bleed lines.
hThe OGTS air inlet valves include the SMF tempering air valve (TV-014), the SMF dust transfer valve
(YV-012), the thermal oxidizer air inlet valve (FV-609), the bumer ambient air supply valve (FV-648), and the
oxidation ambient air supply valve (FV-661).
'For the external events and natural events representative accidents, the SAC: Emergency Preparedness Program
is in addition to the safety-significant SSCs and/or TSRs listed for representative accidents where external events or
natural events may be the accident initiator.
aThe SAC is derived or also derived from the system evaluation ofsafety-significant SSCs in Section 4.4 of
RPP-23429.
RPP-23429, 2005, Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Preliminary Documented Sqfety Analysis, Rev. 0,
CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.
RPP-CALC-30596, 2006, Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Accident Analysis Source Terms, Rev. 0,
CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington.
ATS
DWTS
HEGA
HEPA
ICV
ISO
LCO
MAEB
NOx
OGTS
SAC
SMF
SS
SSC
TSR
UPS
automatic transfer switch.
Dried Waste Transfer System.
high-efficiency gas absorption.
high-efficiency particulate air (filter).
In-Container Vitrification.
International Organization for Standardization.
limiting condition for operation.
Melt Area Enclosure Building.
nitrogen oxides.
Off-Gas Treatment System.
specific administrative control.
sintered metal filter.
safety-significant.
structures, systems, and components.
technical safety requirement.
uninterruptible power supply.
Conclusion
During the past 5 years of the DBVS project, the safety analyses have presented a significant
challenge with regard to applicability of requirements. In its earliest days, the project was a "fast
track" effort intended to be a technology demonstration rather than a prototype for a production
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facility. Later, the project was viewed by internal and external regulators as one ofthe first
"green field" projects to be built at Hanford in many years, and a chance to design and build a
new facility rather than having to retrofit requirements onto an existing facility built, in some
cases, several decades earlier. As a result, the project has grown through the years. Some ofthe
areas in which early challenges were met and consensus achieved are discussed below.
One ofthe areas that presented an early challenge was hazard categorization. Separate hazard
categorizations were initially considered for a two-phased DBVS project. The first phase of the
project was to be "less than Hazard Category 3" due to a very limited MAR ofapproximately
1,000 gal. The second phase was to be Hazard Category 2, due to its physical connection to the
tank farms. The separate phases were subsequently abandoned because ofa lack of benefit (the
hazards were determined to be mainly toxicological, so the same controls would be necessary for
protection ofthe public, collocated and facility workers whether radiological MAR was present
or not). The preliminary hazard categorization was determined to be Hazard Category 3 based on
the inventory of the radiological constituents and fissile material within DBVS. Based on the
hazard and accident analysis in the PDSA, a final hazard categorization of Hazard Category 3
applies to the DBVS facility as unmitigated hazardous conditions present the potential for
significant local toxicological consequences during operation. There was some discussion with
regulators on this topic because of the method used to derive the Hazard Category 3 ratios in
DOE-STD-l027-92. The ratios are built around a radiological dose of 1 rem at 100m as a
significant dose. Even though the DBVS facility had an analyzed dose ofapproximately 7 rem at
100 m for the worst case dried waste release event, DOE-STD-l027-92 discusses the "generally
conservative" nature of the airborne release fractions used to develop the threshold inventory
values for its hazard categorizations, and allows for the scenario of some accidents, particularly
those involving powders and liquids, to produce a higher airborne release fraction that that used
to develop the threshold values, while not affecting the overall hazard categorization of the entire
facility.
Another area ofdiscussion during the course ofthe project was the "packaging" ofthe DBVS
safety analysis documentation. The DBVS PDSA was initially developed as a "delta" analysis
with the intent ofappending it to the Tank Farms DSA. With the decision to have a separate
DSA, the hazard and accident analysis were performed again for Revision I to derive the
accidents directly from the DBVS facility. The programmatic chapters of the DBVS PDSA refer
to Tank Farms DSA, but they also provide supplemental information for DBVS project as
required.
In July 2006, DOE 0 413.3 was revised to DOE 0 413.3A which referenced DOE-STD-1189-
2008 as the source of information regarding the form and content ofa PSDR. Some ofthe DBVS
design was completed to a degree beyond that required for a PSDR in DOE-STD-1189-2008
(Le., remained unchanged from the PDSA submittal in October 2006) and other areas had been
changed from the "final design" analyzed in that PDSA. ORP and CH2M HILL agreed that
CH2M HILL would not completely revise the PDSA for the CD-2 submittal, but would
supplement the PDSA with PSDR-Ievel analyses on those areas of the design that had been
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modified subsequent to the previous design freeze date of July 2006, keeping the format of
DOE-STD-3009-94.
Revision 2 ofthe DBVS PDSA is scheduled for submittal to ORP in May 2008 as part of the
CD-3 package for the project. Analyses performed for the unique DBVS accident scenarios
indicated that the offsite radiological risk evaluation guideline was not challenged (Le., all safety
SSCs remain safety significant rather than safety class) and all radiological consequences for
onsite collocated and facility workers are "low." A considerable number ofpreventive and
mitigative controls in the form of safety-significant SSCs, ACs, and design features were
identified (see Table 2) to reduce the risk to the offsite public and onsite collocated workers from
potential toxicological exposures and for hazardous conditions that present a significant risk to
the facility workers.
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